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Legal systems blend social cognition—inferences about the minds of 
others—with the social context.1 This is accomplished primarily through 
defining group boundaries. Specifically, legal systems dictate which people 
are governed within their jurisdiction. These people can all be considered 
part of the ingroup that the legal system represents. In fact, legal systems 
were created to facilitate people living together in large groups.2 This social 
contract requires people to be subject to the laws of their respective local, 
state, national, and international groups. Therefore, despite Rousseau’s 
theorizing of legal systems being created for all humanity, people governed 
by legal systems are assumed to belong to the relevant ingroup, however 
such a group is defined.
Because human beings are capable of great good and evil—they 
commit human atrocities and (arguably) display altruistic behavior—it begs 
the question; what psychological mechanism could facilitate great help and 
harm? Here flexible social cognition provides insight. Since people are 
motivated by the contents of their minds, which drive their behavior, social 
cognition is central to legal decisions. Psychological research demonstrates 
that social cognition engagement is flexible, that is, it is possible to both 
extend social cognition towards non-human agents,3 and withhold social 
cognition from other people.4 The phenomenon of withholding social cog-
* Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London.
1. See generally LASANA HARRIS, INVISIBLE MIND: FLEXIBLE SOCIAL COGNITION AND 
DEHUMANIZATION (2017).
2. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (G.D.H. Cole trans., Dover Publ’ns 
2003) (1762).
3. See HARRIS, supra note 1.
4. See e.g., Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging 
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847 (2006) [Harris & Fiske, Dehumanizing the 
Lowest of the Low]; Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Social Groups that Elicit Disgust Are Differentially 
Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 45 (2007) [hereinafter Harris & 
Fiske, Social Groups]; Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, The Brooms in Fantasia: Neural Correlates of 
Anthropomorphizing Objects, 26 SOC. COGNITION 210 (2008) [hereinafter Harris & Fiske, Brooms in 
Fantasia]; Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Social Neuroscience Evidence for Dehumanised Perception,
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nition is termed dehumanized perception: the failure to engage social cog-
nitive processing in the presence of another human being.5
Legal theory incorporates dehumanization in thinking about mass 
atrocities against humanity, including as a tool to incite collective violence 
and genocide, as well as during dignity takings incurred when people suffer 
property seizure by the state or governmental authority. Focusing just on 
the latter concept of dignity takings, there are a couple of distinctions that 
immediately need to be made regarding the use of the concept in the legal 
context, and its view in the psychological literature. Firstly, legal scholars 
pair infantilization with dehumanization, treating them as separable con-
structs, while the psychological literature views infantilization as a compo-
nent of dehumanization. For instance, some psychological theories of social 
cognition separate agency (one’s ability to initiate one’s own behavior) and 
experience (one’s phenomenology), and situate infantilization within the 
experience dimension.6
Secondly, and more importantly, legal scholars consider dehumaniza-
tion almost entirely from the target’s perspective (for instance the person or 
group who losses property), whereas the psychological literature has empir-
ically studied dehumanization from the perpetrators perspective. In the 
legal case, the perpetrator is the state, governmental authority, or some 
other non-human entity (such as a country). Indeed, perhaps a person held 
the role of executor of decision, but it is often argued that any person in 
that role would be expected to execute the decision because it is in the best 
interest of the state or governmental authority, and the decision was taken 
not in the person’s best interest, but in the state or governmental authority’s 
best interest (and sometimes in the dehumanized victims’ best interest as 
well). Therefore, the psychological literature can only comment on the 
psychological state (perhaps) of that executor of the decision, not on the 
cultural perspective that sanctioned dehumanization of the group or person 
by the state or governmental authority, in order to better align state or gov-
ernmental interests. Therefore, throughout this review paper, I will consider 
whether there was a specific, identifiable perpetrator: an actor or actors 
whose minds may have engaged a dehumanized perception. If such a per-
petrator can be identified, then I argue that the social role (an aspect of the 
social context) encouraged a dehumanized perception.
20 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 192 (2009) [hereinafter Social Neuroscience]; Lasana Harris & Susan 
Fiske, Dehumanised Perception: A Psychological Means to Facilitate Atrocities, Torture, and Geno-
cide? 219 J. PSYCHOL. 175 (2011) [hereinafter Harris & Fiske, Dehumanised Perception].
5. See sources cited supra note 4.
6. Heather M. Gray et al., Dimensions of Mind Perception, 315 SCI. 619, 619 (2007).
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This approach applies all five tenets of dehumanization espoused by 
the psychological research. The first tenet states that everyone is capable of 
dehumanization. This is satisfied because anyone in the social role would 
have enacted the decision that resulted the dehumanized perception. It sug-
gests everyone is capable of dehumanizing another person if the people in 
the role are not exceptional in some way, such as psychopathic, or in pos-
session of a high number of sociopathic traits for instance. This is also easi-
ly satisfied in most cases. The second tenet states that the social context 
promotes dehumanization. This is satisfied since the social role as a kind of 
a social context determines when dehumanization takes place. The third 
tenet states that dehumanization does not always lead to negative behavior. 
Most behavior that results dignity takings does not stem from a negative or 
harmful act, but a logical or reasonable one that maximizes financial bene-
fit, avoids harm of the victims, or makes a product or service more effi-
cient. Therefore, the act itself is not harmful, and the outcomes are often 
positive for the state or governmental authority (though negative for the 
dehumanized victim). The fourth tenet suggests dehumanization is func-
tional, allowing the completion of a task at hand. This is satisfied for rea-
sons stated in the first and third tenet; dehumanization facilitates the 
decision-making process of the person or group of persons that results the 
dignity taking. Finally, the fifth tenet—dehumanization avoids empathy 
exhaustion—is the most difficult to satisfy without getting information 
from the decision-makers private minds. Therefore, this final tenet remains 
unsatisfied by my approach, but is nonetheless consistent with the fourth 
tenet that dehumanization is functional. Empathy is a negative emotional 
experience that results positive outcomes to others, often at a personal cost; 
avoiding such an emotional state is functional, particularly if the decision 
could result negative outcomes for the dehumanized victims.
II. DEHUMANIZED PERCEPTION AND FLEXIBLE SOCIAL COGNITION
The actual, imagined, or implied presence of another human being 
spontaneously triggers dual person perception processes. This duality sug-
gests that people are in fact Cartesian dualists. The first process is feature 
space matching—comparing the visual pattern of the person, including 
their height, skin color, and other appearance-based features to templates 
stored in the visual and temporal cortices of the brain7—allowing person 
7. James V. Haxby et al., Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Face and Object Representa-
tions in the Human Brain, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 889–904 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 3d 
ed. 2004); Alexander Todorov, The Social Perception of Faces, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
COGNITION 96–114 (Susan T. Fiske & C. Neil Macrae eds., 2012).
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identification, and triggering the second process, social cognition. This 
second process, however, does not depend on visual input to engage, allow-
ing the imagined or implied qualifiers regarding the presence of another 
person to be necessary. Such social cognitive responses rely on Bayesian 
inferences aggregated from statistical information about the behavior of 
people8, as well as bodily responses that provide physiological feedback 
about the self.9 In the brain, parts of neo-cortex, including medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC), precuneus, temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) extending 
along the superior temporal sulcus (STS) to the anterior temporal pole 
(ATP), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) underlie social cognition. This 
massive network of brain regions suggests that social cognition requires 
substantial processing, despite the fact that the experience of social cogni-
tive engagement is spontaneous and effortless.
I argue that the social context and goals can determine whether social 
cognition is extended or withheld. For instance, regarding the other promi-
nent use of dehumanization involving mass atrocities, collective violence, 
and crimes against humanity, instances of torture perpetrated by American 
and British troops in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are due to the social 
context: a threatening environment and a chain of command demanding 
results perhaps resulted in these extremely harmful behaviors.10 Similarly, 
genocides and collective violence in Rwanda, Germany, Yugoslavia, Cam-
bodia, and Darfur were all enabled by social contexts that dehumanized the 
victims, painting them as vermin and less human. Most disturbingly, mod-
ern human trafficking and New World slavery resulted from social goals 
that prioritized profit at the expense of dignity, civility, and human decen-
cy. In all of these cases, social cognition could trigger emotional responses 
that would conflict with the social goals and the social context,11 making 
dehumanized perception necessary.
However, the cases just described cannot be subject to experimental 
scrutiny for obvious ethical reasons. Nonetheless, dehumanization does not 
escape empirical study because brain activity provides an index of whether 
social cognition has been engaged or not. In one such experiment, partici-
8. See, e.g., Fritz Heider, Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality, 51 PSYCHOL. REV. 358
(1944); Alison Gopnik & Henry Wellman, Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Is a Theory, 7 MIND &
LANGUAGE 145 (1992). Alison Gopnik & Henry Wellman, Reconstructing Constructivism: Causal 
Models, Bayesian Learning Mechanisms, and the Theory Theory, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1085 (2012).
9. Manos Tsakiris, The Multisensory Basis of the Self: From Body to Identity to Others, 70 Q. J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 597, 597–609 (2017).
10. Susan Fiske et al., Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners, 306 SCI. 1482, 1482–83
(2004).
11. Harris & Fiske, Social Neuroscience, supra note 4.
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pants were shown stereotypical pictures of different societal groups, such 
as homeless people, drug addicts, rich people, elderly people, and college 
students while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging.12 Par-
ticipants were tasked with indicating what emotions the pictures made them 
feel. Results reveal that the social cognition brain network was less en-
gaged when viewing the pictures of members of traditionally dehumanized 
social groups such as the homeless and drug addicts. Participants also rated 
these people as lower on warmth and competence—the two primary trait 
dimensions of person perception—and indicated that they elicited disgust.13
Moreover, they used less mental state verbs (such as wish, want, relax) 
when describing a day in the life of these people, rated them lower on di-
mensions that distinguish human beings from animals and objects such as 
intelligence and articulateness, and reported more difficulty when attempt-
ing to infer their personality and their mental state.14
Participants playing violent first-person-shooter video games also dis-
play the dehumanized perception brain pattern.15 In this experiment, expe-
rienced video-game players competed against their friends in a kill-or-be-
killed virtual scenario. These participants displayed the dehumanized per-
ception brain response just before pulling the trigger to blow away their 
friends’ avatars.
The dehumanization brain response also occurs in cases of sexism. 
Highly benevolent and hostile sexist men endorse ideas suggesting that 
women should be cherished, protected, and put on a pedestal, but should 
not engage in work outside the home. Such men exhibit the dehumanized 
perception brain response when viewing pictures of scantily clad females 
compared to fully clad females.16 Moreover, such men fail to attend to the 
faces of scantily clad females, fixating instead on their bodies.17
Finally, everyday people are also capable of dehumanizing other eve-
ryday people. In one such demonstration, we first created a labor market 
based on participants’ (players’) ability to estimate time intervals. Another 
12. Harris & Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low, supra note 4; Harris & Fiske, Social 
Groups, supra note 4; Harris & Fiske, Dehumanised Perception, supra note 4.
13. Susan Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth 
Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 
902 (2002).
14. Harris & Fiske, Dehumanised Perception, supra note 4.
15. Klaus Mathiak & Rene Weber, Toward Brain Correlates of Natural Behavior: fMRI during 
Violent Video Games, 27 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 948, 956 (2006).
16. Mina Cikara et al., From Agents to Objects: Sexist Attitudes and Neural Responses to Sexual-
ized Targets, 23 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 540, 540–51 (2011).
17. Philippe Bernard et al., Integrating Sexual Objectification with Object Versus Person Recog-
nition: The Sexualized-Body-Inversion Hypothesis, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 469, 469–71 (2012).
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group of participants (owners) were then endowed with money and bought 
five such players to comprise a time estimation team who would compete 
on behalf of the owners for the owners’ financial benefit. Owners exhibited 
the dehumanized perception brain response when they viewed pictures of 
the players they purchased to compete on their behalf.18
In addition to the brain imaging evidence, behavioral evidence also 
supports the everyday occurrence of dehumanization, specifically in the 
context of intergroup relations. For instance, research on infrahumanization 
theory demonstrates that people attribute to their outgroup less secondary, 
complex emotions that require social cognition.19 People rate outgroups as 
less evolved on a scale of human evolution.20 Americans of predominantly 
African descent are implicitly associated with apes, and media references to 
ape and jungle analogies and metaphors during capital cases in Philadelph-
ia predict whether a descendant of African, not European descent, will be 
sentenced to death.21
More importantly, the engagement of social cognition enacts moral 
and social rules that govern behavior towards other people, and allow us to 
impression manage since we can determine whether we have conveyed a
positive impression to another person.22 Human beings are agents—they 
are capable of originating their own behaviors. However they are flexible 
and intentional agents since they can change their minds. Moreover, when a 
person encounters another person, that second person is also forming an 
impression of the first person. Since people care about the impressions 
others have of them to maintain a positive reputation, they are constantly 
adjusting their behavior based on their social cognitive inferences. Addi-
tionally, it is very difficult to verify whether inferences gleaned from social 
cognition engagement are accurate since people are capable of deception.23
The occurrence of social cognition distinguishes person perception 
from object perception since people possess minds.24 For instance, comput-
ers, like people, are information processing systems that register and learn, 
18. Lasana Harris et al., Assigning Economic Value to People Results in Dehumanization Brain 
Response, 7 J. NEUROSCI. PSYCHOL. & ECON. 151, 159–63 (2014).
19. Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., Psychological Essentialism and the Differential Attribution of 
Uniquely Human Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 395, 411 (2001).
20. Nour Kteily et al., The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Blatant De-
humanization, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 901, 901–31 (2015).
21. See, e.g., Phillip A. Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumaniza-
tion, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292 (2008).
22. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO 
CULTURE (2d ed. 2013).
23. See generally HARRIS, supra note 1.
24. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 22.
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and display agency in that they can make decisions based on programmed 
algorithms. However, because they do not have minds, we are not con-
cerned with their impressions of us, and we do not apply moral rules when 
interacting with them.
III. PUNISHMENT
As discussed above, the concept of dehumanization is central to legal 
arguments regarding genocide and crimes against humanity, but recently it 
has been incorporated into property law with the concept dignity takings. In 
such legal instances, the relevant group perhaps can be considered all hu-
manity. In fact, I argue elsewhere that the concept of human emerged from 
the concept of ingroup.25 In our evolutionary past, human beings lived in 
much smaller groups than we do today. As a result, most other humans 
encountered were ingroup members. Legal systems therefore can allow 
exclusion from the ingroup of humanity, utilizing dehumanization and dig-
nity takings since dehumanization excludes a person from moral and legal 
protection reserved for human beings.
Moreover, legal systems are primarily concerned with punishment. 
More specifically, legal systems are concerned with punishing people with 
bad minds that motivate bad behavior. This allows legal systems to enforce 
rules that govern social interactions, and interactions between individuals, 
institutions, and non-human entities such as the state or government. One 
motive for punishing such people is to influence the future occurrence of 
such behavior, both by incapacitating the guilty party, and by deterring 
others from engaging in such behavior. As a result, punishers have become 
professionalized in modern societies, including prosecutors, judges, police 
and prison officer.26
When considering the brain, research on punishment suggests that it is 
driven by a largely affective response.27 Participants’ punishment severity 
tends to correlate with activity in the amygdala; a brain region implicated 
in fear conditioning, learning, and general emotional processes.28 This is 
consistent with the functions of punishment. Punishment communicates to 
the punished and to everyone else that the social contract is not to be bro-
ken. It suggests that the group is not to be tampered with. Indeed, forms of 
25. HARRIS, supra note 1.
26. Fiery Cushman, Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions, 10 PHIL. COMPASS
117, 133 (2015).
27. Joshua Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-party Punishment, 60 NEURON 930,
930–40 (2008).
28. THE HUMAN AMYGDALA (Paul J. Whalen & Elizabeth A. Phelps eds., 2009).
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punishment in human history often entailed public displays, for instance 
impaling severed heads on pikes that were then displayed at the castle wall. 
Given that emotions are also communicative signals, providing information 
about the internal state of the person displaying the emotion, it follows that 
an emotional response drives punishment decisions.
Moreover brain systems underlying punishment often extend beyond 
the amygdala,29 incorporating regions of prefrontal cortex (PFC) and or-
bito-frontal cortex (OFC) involved in higher order cognition such as rea-
soning and decision-making, as well as the anterior insula, a brain region 
involved in disgust responses and interoception.30 Other subcortical regions 
are also involved beyond the amygdala, including the periaqueductal grey 
as well as parts of the striatum: brain regions important in learning and 
decision-making.31 This suggests that punishment is more than an affective 
response, but requires higher order cognition and decision-making, and 
triggers learning mechanisms.
These brain activation patterns are also consistent with other functions 
of punishment beyond communicating something about the social contract 
and the ingroup. Punishment also enables restoration of the ingroup, build-
ing group cohesion.32 This may occur because punishment also satisfies the 
need for vengeance amongst group members.33 Again, earlier forms of 
human punishment allowed each member of the group to enact vengeance: 
placing the punished in stocks for public display and torment, groups pelt-
ing stones or other projectiles at the punished, and public executions all 
allow the group to exact some measure of vengeance. Interestingly, here we 
have group behavior perpetrated by specific actors who are not identified or 
held accountable, but all of whom presumably have a similar mind-set that 
motivates the negative behavior against the punished, painting it as neces-
sary. A similar phenomenon occurs during dignity takings, where the indi-
vidual that facilitates the dignity taking is not held accountable, and the 
larger group (state or governmental authority) is blamed and held account-
able.
29. See Ben Seymour et al., The Neurobiology of Punishment, 8 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 300,
303–11 (2007).
30. A.D. Craig, How Do You Feel—Now? The Anterior Insula and Human Awareness, 10
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 59, 60–70 (2009).
31. Daphna Shohamy, Learning and Motivation in the Human Striatum, 21 CURRENT OPINION 
NEUROBIOLOGY 408, 408–14 (2011).
32. George Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, 63 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1339, 
1339–40 (1961).
33. Kevin Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, in 40
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 226 (2008).
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IV. DEHUMANIZATION AND DIGNITY TAKINGS
The legal concept of dignity takings states that this phenomenon oc-
curs when the state confiscates or destroys property from individuals con-
sidered less than human.34 This concept that originated within property law 
has been expanded beyond this domain (see the contents of this law review 
issue), and now includes instances where dehumanization facilitates actions 
by the state or other governmental authority outside the domain of proper-
ty, including medical care, education, and music among many others. The 
commonality across these different domains is that something has been 
taken away by a non-human entity, or group (state, governmental authority, 
even culture), from another person or group of persons. Therefore, dehu-
manization is central to this legal concept (as stated above, I include infan-
tilization as a form of dehumanization, thus I will only discuss the broader 
concept).
However, this legal concept that hinges on dehumanization makes a 
number of assumptions about dehumanization that rely on lay theories, not 
the scientific research described above. As a result, there are important 
differences between the psychological concept of dehumanization, and 
dehumanization as it is discussed in the legal case of dignity takings. For 
instance, lay theories of dehumanization associate it with humiliation and 
violence. However, the scientific research suggests that dehumanization is 
more of an everyday phenomenon, capable of being committed by anyone 
against anyone else. Furthermore, as described above, the scientific view of 
dehumanization requires an identifiable perpetrator: a person whom is re-
sponsible for failing to infer the mind of another, thus makes a decision or 
takes action that results in dignity taking. But the dignity takings concept 
does not require an identifiable perpetrator, and leverages the perpetrator as 
the state or some other governmental authority. Therefore, no single person 
is responsible for dehumanizing the victims, and the dignity takings result 
as a consequence of the actions of the state or governmental authority.
How then are these differences best reconciled? Regarding the first 
difference, a milder definition of dehumanization as espoused by the scien-
tific work is not inconsistent with the approach to dignity takings described 
in the other articles in this review. In fact, extending dignity takings beyond 
34. See generally BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA’S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014); Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Con-
cept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171
(2016); Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical 
Framework to Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796 (2016).
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property law requires a milder definition of dehumanization, allowing it to 
be observed in employment, health-care, education, and even music and 
popular culture. Some might even argue that the initial move of dehumani-
zation from human atrocities to property law necessitated a milder defini-
tion of dehumanization. The second difference is not as easily reconciled. 
In most cases, a specific actor is not identified as responsible for engaging 
a dehumanized perception during dignity takings. However, the experience 
of the dehumanized victims may allow us to reconcile the legal with the 
psychological concept. A state or governmental authority can be anthropo-
morphized, that is, can be viewed as possessing a mind. If a person experi-
ences dehumanization, labeling the experienced behavior as 
‘dehumanizing’ requires an inference based on the behaviors of another, 
including perhaps an anthropomorphized other. If the people who have 
their dignity taken view the state as an anthropomorphized being, then it is 
possible that they can infer that the state dehumanizes them, resulting in a 
dignity taking. This attempt at reconciliation hinges on the view of the 
victim, the person or group whose dignity has been taken, not the state or
governmental authority perpetrating the offense. As a result, it is perfectly 
valid to consider the victims’ point of view, reconciling the legal definition 
of dignity taking with the scientific research on dehumanization. Next, I 
consider whether the scientific view of dehumanization may find support in 
a few of the cases of dignity takings described in this review.
V. WEAKER CASES FOR DIGNITY TAKING WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE
A. Criminal Punishment
The more relaxed application of dignity takings beyond the domain of 
property law employed in this review allows a number of other legal do-
mains to become relevant. One such domain is criminal punishment. For 
instance, psychological research has already demonstrated relationships 
between dehumanizing language in the media and death-penalty sentenc-
es.35 Indeed, as Acevedo describes, the Common Law enacted in seven-
teenth century England not only sentenced the guilty to death (a fate worse 
than dignity taking), but also confiscated their property so that their heirs 
were also punished. This extreme form of punishment, it is argued, is an 
example of dignity taking because the heirs are now dehumanized, deemed 
not worthy of inheritance. The early American settlers who fled to the Mas-
35. See Goff et al., supra note 21.
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sachusetts Bay Colony sought to avoid such harsh punishment, yet instanti-
ated other forms of punishment that destroyed the body, not property. For
instance, cases of ‘scarlet letters’, pillorying, whipping, and other forms of 
public punishment harken to medieval forms of punishment, communi-
cating to the community that the punished was less than human.
One can argue whether indeed these forms of punishment carried out 
on the body constitute a dignity taking. More specifically, one can ask 
whether they meet the two necessary criteria for dignity taking: confisca-
tion of property and dehumanization. The initial burden of proof lies with 
whether bodily harm equates to bodily confiscation. Incapacitating some-
one’s body denies them their ability to perform simple human biological 
functions, and could constitute a confiscation. Moreover, the state can take 
a person’s body and use it for their own purposes, such as forced labor 
while imprisoned. Therefore, the confiscation element of dignity taking 
seems to be present. However, proving dehumanization is a bit more diffi-
cult when subject to the criteria I have previously identified; an identifiable 
perpetrator. In these cases, the bodily harm was often carried out by a pro-
fessional punisher who themselves did not make the decision to execute the 
harm. The decision to harm the body was often made by other professional 
punishers who themselves were simply following the advice of legal code, 
not their own personal motives. As such, we must rely on the concept of an 
anthropomorphized entity to justify that dehumanization has occurred. 
When one is hanged or burned at the stake, it is not possible to ascertain the 
one’s view of the state whose legal code promotes such behavior. This task 
becomes even more difficult since these are historical incidents with in-
complete and other biased accounts. Therefore, the jury is still out as to 
whether these forms of criminal punishment constitute dehumanization and 
subsequent dignity takings.
B. Kurdish Independence.
The difficulty of identifying unequivocally that dignity taking has oc-
curred is suffered by other accounts beyond property law discussed in this 
volume. For instance, Albert argues that the Iraqi Kurds suffer dignity tak-
ings because of a denial of self-determination in their quest for independ-
ence and self-governance. Stated differently, the state of Iraq has taken 
their dignity because they have not been allowed self-governance when 
they are certainly capable of governing themselves. This view of dignity 
taking and the resulting dehumanization is consistent with the scientific 
definitions, but again lays the role of perpetrator at the feet of the state, not 
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a specific individual. Moreover, this view of dignity taking hinges on deni-
al of property rights, in addition to a denial of self-governance.
Such dignity takings, however, require a person’s mind to justify ex-
planatory arguments for abuses that include dehumanization. Yes, Iraqi 
Kurds can report that they have experienced dehumanization and have had 
their dignity taken. But the social cognition requirement that these victims 
have an identified perpetrator, real or anthropomorphized, is more difficult 
to meet. Because the state, not a single mind (or small group of minds), was 
behind the denial of self-determination, then an anthropomorphized perpe-
trator is most likely. Perhaps political leaders represent the single individu-
als who execute the act, but if it is likely that any other non-Iraqi Kurd 
would have performed the behavior when in the role of political leader, 
then it is the role itself that is attributed mind, not the specific person in-
volved. Does such an assertion remove the Iraqi Kurds from the realm of 
dignity taking? Perhaps not, given the property loss incurred at the hands of 
the Iraqi government. Nonetheless, the strong claim of dignity taking is 
difficult to justify since the perpetrator again is the state, not a specific 
individual.
C. Other Cases
Similarly difficult justifications also occur with the Columbian land 
restitution, Polish workers, and African music appropriation in Europe. In 
each of these cases, it is extremely difficult to identify a perpetrator be-
cause the perpetrator is either the state, or culture. As such, though the vic-
tims have all suffered a loss, the application of the psychological definition 
suggests dignity taking claims fall slightly short.
VI. STRONGER CASES FOR DIGNITY TAKING WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE
A. Tax Delinquency Sales
Perhaps the phenomenon of tax delinquency sales best meets the re-
quirements for strong dignity taking claims. Kahrl describes a particularly 
egregious form of dignity taking related to tax delinquency: The sale of tax 
liens by governmental authorities to private investors resulting in the ex-
ploitation of specific populations, particularly racial minorities and the 
elderly, allowing the private investors to seize their property because of 
minor financial infractions regarding the paying of property tax. Here, dig-
nity taking surrounds the abuse of tax laws and loopholes by private inves-
tors to dispossess those who are more vulnerable to dehumanization 
2017] A SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 737
because of their social class, ethnicity, or age. This case does provide an 
identifiable perpetrator who is responsible for dehumanizing a victim: the 
private investors. However, as is the case with other dignity takings, the 
dehumanization is facilitated by the state: changes in complicated property 
tax laws are not properly communicated to the victims, and payments are 
even sometimes ignored. Such obvious dignity takings demonstrate collab-
oration between the state and private investors to execute dehumanizing 
behavior, suggesting that even if specific perpetrators are identified, they 
are still not culpable since the state facilitates their abuses, making them 
legal.
One might argue for a strong case of dignity takings in cases of tax de-
linquency sales since the perpetrator can be identified. Despite the fact that 
a few such individuals could be identified, they do so only in the social role 
of private investors. Like all others, this role absconds them of blame given 
its legal status, but protests less against the moral responsibility attached to 
these people. Now we have a case of dignity taking with all components. 
Moreover, the manner of execution of the dignity taking suggests the minds 
of the homeowners were not considered, confirming their dehumanized 
status. Interestingly, this issue was first identified by formerly enslaved 
people of African descent in America, a most egregious case of dehumani-
zation in human history.
B. School Closure
The question remains have we made a turn, and have we identified in-
stances of dignity taking that satisfies legal definition and could be backed 
up perhaps by strong biological claims? A similar account applies in school 
closures in Chicago, Illinois; another instance where the state, in collabora-
tion with specific individuals, facilitates dignity takings. In this scenario 
described by Shaw, the governmental authority closes a neighborhood 
school, reassigning children to schools further away. These schools often 
required the children walking through violent neighborhoods bordering 
their own, rather than staying in their community, despite the parents’ con-
tributions to the development of the now closed school. Here, the identified 
perpetrator is the government board or council responsible for making such 
decisions. Again, their small numbers make them more identifiable, despite 
the fact that again their social role barred them from full legal culpability.
Moreover, this particular case adds another wrinkle; a consideration of 
what dignity takings may be like when a small group of people decide to 
enact property violations than result in the removal of communities due to 
dehumanization. Indeed, many people in the role of board or council repre-
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sentative could make an alternative decision and go against the majority, 
but the majority nonetheless could be accused of dehumanization that re-
sults dignity taking. Further, the criteria for school closure relied solely on 
an algorithm that failed to consider many variables relevant to community 
and the residents, along with failings by school board members to show up 
at meetings and hearings, confirming the suspicion of dehumanization and 
dignity takings.
C. Hospital Closings
And such abuses continue concerning hospital care as well. Again, as 
is the case for schools, a community loses one of its most necessary institu-
tions. In the particular case described by Ossei-Owusu in Los Angeles, 
California, not only did the local authority remove the hospital, but they 
replaced it with an inadequate one, allowing common descriptions of the 
hospital to be a place where you go to die, not survive. This particular level 
of dignity taking arises perhaps more on the implicit level, where the pres-
ence of a hospital, regardless of its ability to execute its intended functions 
well, is sufficient to avoid engaging the minds of the community members. 
This presents perhaps a case where dehumanized perception promotes ra-
tional cost-benefit analysis of information collected from such places, justi-
fying all related decisions by the local authority.
The dignity takings suffered by the ethnic minority members of the 
population of Los Angeles is often unheard because it resulted in death. In 
this case, dignity taking leads not only to threat to life by walking through a 
dangerous neighborhood to attend school everyday, but often death and 
disability when such could have been avoided. Despite this fact, decision-
makers can continue to live free of guilt because the psychological process-
es necessary to trigger empathy and other such social emotions like guilt, 
shame, and compassion have not gotten into gear. Death is no longer the 
great moral trigger it is in other instances.
D. Bath-Houses
Another interesting case of dignity taking comes from the closure of 
bath-houses in New York city by the New York Public Health Authority 
described by Engel and Lyle. Such closures removed a safe space for so-
cializing for members of the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgendered 
(LGBT) community since they used such facilities as places where their 
hidden stigma could be comfortably and safely revealed. LGBT identity is 
often concealed, meaning that the stigma is hidden, but focusing on the 
2017] A SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 739
physical spaces they occupied within the city could still target LGBT indi-
viduals despite the concealed identity. Bath-houses were one such physical 
space. What makes the closure of these facilities interesting is that the iden-
tifiable perpetrators (NYC Public Health) used claims regarding violations 
of public health codes as justification for the closures. In other words, the 
perpetrators claimed to be protecting the victims, not harming them. A 
similar situation occurred when considering the school and hospital clo-
sures discussed above; these institutions did not meet a metric for perfor-
mance and or efficiency, therefore were deemed more harmful that helpful, 
warranting their closure.
But why would the perpetrators require a benefit claim as justification 
for their harm to the victims? Does this not suggest that they did not dehu-
manize the victims, but considered their minds and took action intended for 
their benefit? In the abstract, this certainly seems the case. However, true 
consideration of the victims’ perspective would have led to an alternate 
conclusion, and the intended helpful behavior could have been clearly iden-
tified as harmful. In fact, many moral violations occur because of potential 
imagined benefits for the victims instead of simply considering their actual 
perspectives and consistent benefits. After all, many claimed at the time 
that the enslavement of Africans occurred in an attempt to rid them of their 
demonic religions and introduce civility to these less evolved people.
E. Japan-Town
A type of death can often occur to an entire community, again perpe-
trated by a governmental authority. When a city council reassigns the des-
ignation of a neighborhood for financial benefit, this often forces original 
occupants out, and destroys migrant communities. This is a specific case 
where economics can impact dehumanization. For instance, there once 
existed a Japan-town in Sacramento, California, as described by Joo. This 
neighborhood provided food, housing, and community resources for not 
only the Japanese migrants, but also those who valued and consumed Japa-
nese products and culture, including such people from beyond the city lim-
its. However, dignity taking was suffered when this neighborhood died 
because of the re-designation.
Again, the question remains; was there an identifiable perpetrator? In 
this case, blame can be attributed to the city council board members. Per-
haps from their point of view, the goal was not to eliminate Japan-town, but 
to boost the economic viability of the land on which the neighborhood sat. 
Indeed, Japan-town’s location in the heart of the city meant that it sat on 
prime real-estate, evidenced by the fact that today that land houses a sport-
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ing complex, with retail shopping and upscale housing. Certainly, any ob-
jective person can agree that economically, much more money is made 
from the current use of the land than when the land hosted Japan-town. 
However, such purely economic views encourage dehumanization because 
they fail to consider the minds of the people affected by such decisions, 
instead considering only the financial rewards. Such an economic view 
probably led to the city council board members dehumanizing the Japanese 
migrants, and facilitated the dignity taking.
F. Trailer Trash
Similarly, changing the designation of land for financial benefit also 
leads to dignity taking of trailer park homeowners. Such people buy their 
low-cost home, often spending many years living in it, making substantial 
financial investments in their property. However, they typically rent the 
land on which such homes reside either from governmental authorities or 
from private investors. Occasionally, these investors or governmental au-
thorities will reassign the use of the land, evicting mobile home owners. 
This reassignment is often for financial benefit; the land could become 
more valuable serving a different purpose rather than low-income housing. 
Despite the term ‘mobile home’, most trailer park homes cannot be moved 
because movement would result in extensive damage to the home. As a 
result, such homes are often demolished, and as happened in the Japan-
town example, communities are destroyed, as described by Sullivan.
Unlike many other examples, finding an identifiable perpetrator in this 
instance is quite easy: the landowner. However, this person is well within 
their rights to do with their land as they please. Nonetheless, I argue that 
such a person making this decision has to dehumanize the mobile park 
homeowners, ignoring their minds and the financial and community loss 
they suffer due to the eviction. The clear identification of a perpetrator in 
this instance makes the dignity taking clear, even when the landowner is a 
governmental authority.
VII. A FINAL THOUGHT REGARDING IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGNITY
RESTORATION
Scientific research has failed to study the psychological consequences 
of being dehumanized. Such research is vital in order to achieve dignity 
restoration following behaviors by the state or governmental authority that 
results dignity taking. This research suggests that a singular mind is re-
quired for the actual occurrence of dehumanized perceptions that facilitate 
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dignity takings. However, since the state or governmental authority usually 
carries out such actions, then an anthropomorphized agent possesses the 
mind responsible. This makes responses to dignity taking to this anthropo-
morphized being different to general dehumanization suffered. Indeed, 
tyrants and dictators, single individuals, not people who simply fill the role 
of political leader or governmental authority figurehead, have classically 
been described as engaging in dehumanization. Moreover, when decisions 
are jointly made, this is a combination of many minds, diffusing the re-
sponsibility for the singular decision, making the anthropomorphism fur-
ther necessary. Therefore, should the concept of dehumanization be left for 
the dictators, initiators of collective violence, or should it be applied to 
property law and all of these other domains?
Certainly, it does suggest that considering dehumanization from the 
perspective of the dehumanized person or group makes relevant the process 
of dignity taking, and provides support for dignity restoration attempts, 
whatever the consequences. An interesting conclusion from this discussion 
surrounds the definition of ‘identifiable’ in the phrase ‘identifiable perpe-
trator’. I have argued that an identifiable perpetrator is necessary in order to 
attribute dignity taking to a particular case because this enables the infer-
ence that such a person ignored the minds or dehumanized the victims. In 
most of the examples discussed in this review, there is not a single perpe-
trator, but a small group who is responsible. Is there a particular group size 
above which the claim of ‘identifiable’ can no longer be made? Perhaps, 
but in the context of this discussion, I have argued that a dignity taking 
occurred when the identifiable perpetrators belonged to governmental 
committees, councils, and the like where there are a finite number of peo-
ple involved in the decision-making process. I have argued that no dignity
taking occurred when the identifiable perpetrator was a country, or another 
large group where a finite number of people did not make the decision, but 
the decision resulted from many other decisions that summed into the act 
that resulted the loss of property. It may be the case that this view of identi-
fiable is itself flawed; one could argue that even in smaller groups, the de-
cision-making process is such that many other decisions also sum to the 
action that results the dignity taking. However, though this may indeed be 
the case, the decision-making process in these smaller groups often does 
not result from such summation, but rather from a direct decision that result 
in the property loss. As such, these decision-makers can be considered 
identifiable. Nonetheless, this issue of identifiable perpetrator is irrelevant 
if dignity taking is simply considered from the victims’ perspective. This is 
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where psychology has to do better if it is to continue to inform legal prac-
tice.
